On the Mathematical Basis of Medical Diagnosis by Turner, Malcolm E.
On the Mathematical 
Basis of 
Medical Diagnosis* 
MALCOLM E. TURNER 
Department of Biometry 
Emory University School of Medicine 
Atlanta, Georgia 
It used to be that a good physician 
could assimilate, retain, and recall 
most of the known facts about medi-
cine. Beginning with the years prior 
to World War II, it became evident 
this was no longer possible. The sys-
temizations to condense facts in other 
fields had not progressed as far as had 
the accumulation of facts in medicine. 
Thus, we have seen the emergence of 
the "medical specialist" and the "team 
approach" to disease. Even this mul-
tiple physician approach is beginning 
to fail before the exponentially in-
creasing array of information about 
pathological processes. 
I believe that there are just three 
things that can be done about this 
overwhelming wealth of information: 
(1) We can develop more specialists 
that are even more specialized, but al-
ready this approach is being hampered 
by problems of communication. (2) 
We can develop more encompassing 
theories of disease so as to reduce the 
large number of facts to a relatively 
few simple hypotheses. This is the 
goal of the model builders, perhaps 
the ideal approach, but we cannot af-
ford to wait for this nirvana. And 
even if this were possible now we 
would only reach a temporary plateau 
upon which new mountains of data 
would pile. (3) The third approach is 
to utilize such mechanical and elec-
tronic slaves as are available to help 
us organize, retain, recall, and com-
municate those observations on dis-
ease worthy of record. I believe we 
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are forced to develop this third ap-
proach while evolving the best com-
promise for the first approach and 
pursuing the second with all possible 
vigor. 
In order to utilize the latest engi-
neering achievements we must be very 
clear about what instructions we give. 
If we are not, we may find ourselves 
in the position of the "sorcerer's ap-
prentice" who failed to learn how to 
turn off the water; only here we will 
have stacks and stacks of meaningless 
paper. 
It is sensible to examine first how 
the human computer works when 
making medical diagnoses (or any 
kind of inductive or scientific infer-
ence) by discussing hypotheses which 
have attempted to describe this proc-
ess. The machinery should be taught 
how to imitate the human diagnosti-
cian. Perhaps then we can find ways 
to improve processes when coupling 
the machine and human brain. 
The concepts to be presented here 
have been discussed before in connec-
tion with medical diagnosis by a num-
ber of authors. I draw attention par-
ticularly to the papers by Neyman 
(1947, 1950), Yerushalmy (1947), 
Chiang (1951), Chiang, Hodges, and 
Yerushalmy (1955), Paycha (1958), 
Arnois, Silverman, and Turner (1959), 
Ledley and Lusted (1959, 1960), 
Shephard and Turner (1959), Tani-
moto (1960), Cady et al. (1961), Van 
Woerkom and Brodman (1961), Ward 
and Hook (1962), Entwisle and En-
twisle (1963), Collen et al. (1964), 
and Nissen-Meyer (1964). 
The discussion is divided into two 
sections. The first section deals with 
the problem of construction of a 
scheme of classification of disease en-
tities. This may be termed the problem 
of classification. The second section 
deals with the credibility of a diag-
nosis after a patient has been assigned 
to a disease entity. The degree of cre-
dence attached to possible assignments 
may be used as the basis of assign-
ment, and hence the basis of medical 
diagnosis itself. I will term this the 
problem of credence. 
The Problem of Classification 
It is convenient to refer to the 
state of a patient at a particular in-
stant of time. Let us suppose that at 
some such instant a patient (or nor-
mal individual) may be completely 
characterized by the concomitant val-
ues of a sufficiently large number of 
variables. Some of these variables, 
such as sex, are constant throughout 
life; some, such as height and weight, 
change relatively slowly. Others, such 
as blood cholesterol, vary dramatically 
at different times. Some are nearly 
constant because of feedback control 
mechanisms. Some are periodic. Some 
strikingly reflect impacts from the en-
vironment. Some are random. Many 
are interrelated in complex fashions, 
and their nature is sought by the 
model builders. Whatever are the 
characteristics of the various variables, 
however, the set of values applying to 
a sufficiently large collection of vari-
ables uniquely characterizes the state 
of the individual at the particular 
point in time. It may be helpful to 
think in geometric terms. Suppose 
each variable is the axis of a geometri-
cal space. If there are n variables 
there will be n axes for our space, and 
we will have an n-dimensional space. 
(It will not harm our concept to vis-
ualize a two-dimensional space with, 
for example, the first axis, X1 , equal 
to the weight of the individual, and 
the second axis, X2 , equal to the sys-
tolic blood pressure of the individual.) 
Now, at a particular instant of time, 
the set of values for the n variables 
will determine a single point in the 
state space. This single point will be 
called the state point of the individual 
at the particular instant. It is easy to 
visualize that in an instant the point 
can shift slightly from its original 
position. So, through life, from the 
moment of birth (or earlier) to the 
moment of death, the individual will 
be uniquely described by a succession 
of adjacent state points. Imagining 
these points strung together we have 
a line of state points twisting and 
bending through the state space from 
birth to death. This is indeed an ab-
stract view of a patient, as a line in 
state space, a life line. One may im-
mediately object to this "coldy mech-
anized" view. However, there is no 
reason in principle why some of the 
n variables cannot represent the emo-
tional and affective states of the indi-
vidual at each instant. Theoretically, 
every human experience and feeling 
can be represented as values on the 
axes, or on combinations of the axes, 
in the state space. 
Suppose there is a line in state space 
for every person in the world, a 
bundle of more than three billion lines! 
As the course of life is somewhat simi-
lar for all of us, the life lines will 
have parallel tendencies although no 
two lines will be identical (possible but 
improbable). Typical individuals will 
lie toward the center of the bundle, 
atypical ones toward the outside. 
Clearly, life lines will not exist in all 
parts of the state space. The dictates 
of life are such that the living mecha-
nism will not function in all possible 
states. Thus, very extreme life lines 
will not exist. Possible but still ex-
treme life lines will occur rarely, 
whereas mild, atypical lines will occur 
much more frequently in this concep-
tion. (This central tendency of the life 
lines is predicted by the "central limit 
theorems" of mathematical probabil-
ity, and is confirmed by common ex-
perience; the mathematical function 
most used to describe the density of 
lines at various distances from the 
center of the bundle is termed the nor-
mal or Gaussian distribution.) 
Some of the lines may represent 
lives which at times have more than 
negligible malfunction. Then the indi-
vidual is diseased. Satellite bundles of 
diseased life lines occur with new 
centers of density. If it is clear (suf-
ficiently low density of lines between 
regions of high density) that these satel-
lite clusters are not fortuitous irregu-
larities in the tail of the normal density, 
then the satellites themselves are rec-
ognized as distinct disease entities and 
are appropriately named. Sometimes 
partial tails of the normal density 
function are taken to be disease en-
tities (although not distinct) when the 
respective states represent some degree 
of malfunction or pathology. It is use-
ful to distinguish these two patterns of 
disease. 
In the past, recognition of disease 
pattern has been largely heuristic. 
Now, powerful quantitative tools exist 
for aiding this process. Of particular 
interest is the generalized measure of 
distance (squared) between cluster 
centers, due to Mahalanobis (1930, 
1936) and known as Mahalanobis' 
D2 • The central idea in the use of D2 
is the measure of the distance (squared) 
between cluster centers, taking into 
account the functional dependencies 
between state variables. If the distance 
between centers is large, compared to 
the scatter about the centers, then 
distinct disease entities are recognized. 
Statistical tests of significance help to 
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distinguish real from accidental clus-
tering. The method of "discriminant 
functions," due to Fisher (1938), and 
the "generalized T' test," due to Hotel-
ling (1931), are mathematically equiva-
lent procedures to D2 • These and some 
other procedures with similar objec-
tives are frequently referred to as 
"cluster analysis." An over-all view 
of the rationale, mathematical deriva-
tion, and uses of these procedures is 
found in Rao (1952). The elementary 
discussions in Shephard and Turner 
(1959) and Hanna, Turner, and 
Hughes (1963) may be helpful. 
Measurements of distances between 
cluster centers may be made for vari-
ous fixed ages yielding a "distance 
function" of age. Alternatively, adjust-
ments of the states for age may be 
made by replacing observed states 
with corresponding (sliding up or down 
the average life line) states at some 
age. The principles of "covariance 
analysis" are appropriate here. 
There is one final consideration 
about choice of procedures for cluster 
analysis before we pass on to the prob-
lem of credence. The D2-T' discrimi-
nant function procedure is based upon 
one rather restrictive assumption about 
the equality of scatter, and interde-
pendencies between variables, about 
two centers which we wish to measure 
the distance between. This assumption 
often is not even approximately true 
when comparing normal and diseased 
life line bundles. In this case, general-
ized procedures are available (Kendall, 
1957), although they have not been 
used widely. 
The Problem of Credence 
Suppose we have divided the state 
space into a set of not necessarily 
mutually exclusive regions recognized 
as disease entities plus the "normal" 
region. It is immaterial whether in-
formal or formal procedures were used 
in arriving at the regions. We will take 
the regions to be fixed for purposes 
of application of the ideas of this 
section. Let us realize, however, that 
these regions will be rearranged at 
times as information about the state 
space accumulates. Further suppose 
that a physician has observations cor-
responding to the values of some of 
the state variables. At this point he ar-
rives at a provisional diagnosis (i.e., 
he assigns the "patient" to one of the 
regions in state space). But this diag-
nosis suffers from uncertainty due to 
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at least two causes: (1) his information 
is incomplete as he cannot measure 
all state variables, and (2) those meas-
urements he has (signs, symptoms, 
tests, etc.) contain intrinsic errors of 
a random or systematic nature, due 
either to physiological variation or to 
measurement error. The physician now 
decides whether to take more measure-
ments (new measurements or replica-
tions of old ones), to begin treatment 
based on his provisional diagnosis, or 
both. His behavior in these two im-
portant respects is predicated largely 
upon his belief in his own diagnosis. 
Thus there is the problem of how best 
to measure and reason about the sub-
jective phenomenon, credibility. 
We will relate credibility to proba-
bility by first examining some concepts 
of probability. The notion of mathe-
matical probability first arose in the 
Italian Renaissance as a theory of re-
petitive happenings which was applied 
to games of chance and even to life 
insurance. The philosophical and 
mathematical bases of the theory of 
probability were subject to much dis-
pute until the purely mathematical as-
pe.cts of the theory were abstracted 
(cf. Kolmogorov, 1956). In this mod-
ern guise the essential ideas of the 
theory of probability can be simply 
stated. We consider the set of possible 
results of an experiment. Call these 
results Ai, A., · · ·, Ak. Suppose B 
is another kind of result of the same 
experiment. We will let A ,B stand 
for the event, "both A , and B happen." 
We will let Ai U B stand for the event, 
"either A, or B, or both A, and B 
happen." We will let S stand for the 
event which must happen, and 0 stand 
for the event which cannot happen. 
Then if we write A,A. = 0 we imply 
that both Ai and A. cannot both hap-
pen. Or if we write Ai U B = S we 
imply that either A, or B must happen. 
Now the theory of probability concerns 
certain real numbers which are as-
signed to each possible experimental 
result and are called "probabilities." 
Thus; we wi\l write p(A,) and read, 
"the probability that Ai happens," or 
write p(A , B) and read "the proba-
bility that either A, or B happens," and 
so forth. It is important to realize that 
the theory of probability itself does 
rtot provide prescriptions for assign-
ing the probabilities. These prescrip-
tions must be obtained from other 
considerations. However, the proba-
bilities must satisfy three restrictions 
(called the axioms of probability): (1) 
p(A ,) ~ 0 where A , is any result, (2) 
p(S) = 1, and (3) if AiA2 = 0 then 
p(A, U A .) = p(A,) + p(A2). This is 
all we need to establish from the theo-
rems of the theory of probability. For 
example, we can derive that p(O) = 0, 
that 0 ;:;:; p(A,) ;:;:; 1, that p(A , U B) = 
p(A,) + p(B) - p(A ,B), and many 
more. Before proceeding we will need 
to make one further definition. Let 
p(BI A,) = p(AiB)I p(A,) and read p(B I 
Ai) as "the probability that B will hap-
pen given that Ai has already hap-
pened," or "the probability of B given 
A , ," for short. Then we say that A , 
and B are independent if p(B I A,) = 
p(B). If B and A, are independent then 
we see that p(A ,B) = p(A,)p(B), the 
famous rule of multiplication for in-
dependent events. 
It would be easy to demonstrate 
the truth of a very remarkable form-
ula discovered by Thomas Bayes 
(1763) and now known as Bayes' 
Theorem. This formula can be writ-
ten: 
p(A , I B) p(A,)p(B I A,) / p(B). 
where p(B) = p(A,)p(B I A ,) + p(A2) 
p(B I A ,) + · · · p(Ak)p(B I A k), and 
supposing that A,, A,, · · ·, Ak are 
mutually exclusive events. 
Probabilities have to do with the 
frequency of occurrence of possible 
outcomes of an experiment. Let us put 
aside all thoughts about probabilities 
and think about a set of possible hy-
potheses, H i , H. , · · ·, H • , to explain 
some observed phenomenon. Suppose 
we would like to measure the credence 
we place in each hypothesis. What 
restrictions should we impose upon 
our measure? It has been suggested 
(cf. Polya, 1954) that rational humans 
behave as though their credences (write 
C(Hi), C(H2), etc., for real measures) 
obeyed the following three restrictions: 
(1) C(H,) ~ 0 where H , is any hy-
pothesis, (2) C(S) = 1 where S = H, U 
H, U · · · U H., and (3) if H,H2 = 0 
then C(H, U H2) = C(H,) + C(H2). Re-
striction (1) says that the measure of 
credibility which we will use is never 
negative. Restriction (2) says that the 
credence in at least one hypothesis is 
assigned the numerical quantity one. 
Finally, restriction (3) says that if two 
hypotheses cannot both be right then 
the degree of credence to be placed 
upon the compound hypothesis "either 
H, or H 2" is simply the sum of the 
respective individual credences. 
The theory of credibility is identical 
in mathematical content to the theory 
of probability, although the purposes 
of the two theories are quite different. 
But since they are mathematically 
equivalent, any theorem of probability 
can be taken over for credence theory, 
and in fact, there is no logical reason 
why we cannot mix probabilities and 
credences in any valid formula de-
rived from the axioms of probability. 
For example, the following mixed 
version of Bayes' Theorem is perfectly 
valid: 
C (H, I B ) = C (H, )p (B I Hi)/p (B ). 
This formula may be interpreted to 
say that if one wants to calculate the 
credence to be placed in hypothesis 
number 1, given the observations B, 
then we need to know two things: (1) 
the credence placed in hypothesis num-
ber 1 before B was observed, and (2) 
the probability that B would be ob-
served if hypothesis number 1 were 
true. Having similar information for 
all alternative hypotheses will allow 
computation of the denominator. This 
is a remarkable result because it pro-
vides a complete solution to the prob-
lem of assigning credences to various 
hypotheses or diagnoses in light of 
any given observations. 
The key to using the mixed version 
of Bayes' Theorem for measuring or 
comparing credence in alternative di-
agnoses is in the source of the prior 
credences, C(H,), C(H2), etc. We con-
sider four different situations. 
1. Prior credences estimated as rela-
tive frequencies of disease entity in a 
particular population. Sometimes it is 
possible to estimate how often each 
disease entity occurs in a population 
from which a current patient was 
drawn at random. Such relative fre-
quencies then may be used as proper 
measures of the prior credence. 
2. Prior credences locally uniform. 
The posterior credence, C(H, [ B) will 
not be much affected by C(H,), the 
prior credence, if there is sufficient 
information in the observations B. This 
situation can be ensured by increasing 
the quality and quantity of the ob-
servations (more examinations, tests, 
etc.). 
3. Prior credences subjective. The 
physician may not have formal infor-
mation of the type encountered in sit-
uation 1 but may have strong, intui-
tively developed measures of prior 
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credence based upon experience. Nu-
merical evaluation of these credences 
can be evoked but can lead to danger-
ous conclusions. Polya (1954) and 
others warn against attempting it; how-
ever, there is no doubt that all practic-
ing physicians act as though they were 
making such an evaluation. 
4. Minimax prior credences. Con-
sider just two competing diagnoses, H, 
and H2 . Suppose the physician would 
take a certain action if the patient had 
disease entity number 1 and another 
action if the patient had disease entity 
number 2. What would be the loss to 
the patient if the wrong action were 
taken? We can choose prior credences 
so that we minimize the maximum loss 
to the patient. This approach neces-
sitates very strong observational in-
formation before the physician will 
depart from the "conservative action." 
The idea applies as well to more than 
two possible diagnoses. 
Most of the current attempts to use 
Bayes' Theorem with electronic com-
puters to aid in making medical diag-
noses involve situation 1 or 2. Thus, 
by situation 1 we replace C(H,), C(H2), 
etc. by observed relative frequencies 
of the respective disease entities, or by 
situation 2 we set the prior credences 
equal to each other; that is, C(H,) = 
C(H,) = · · · = C(H") = 1/k. In either 
case we still need to know the second 
factors in the mixed Bayes' Theorem, 
namely p(B [ H ,), p(B [ H,), etc. We 
recall that these factors represent the 
probabilities of observing the set of 
signs, symptoms, and tests, given that 
a particular diagnosis is correct. In 
current applications these usually are 
empirically determined from the same 
population as are the prior credences 
of situation 1. That is, these proba-
bilities are replaced by the relative 
frequencies of particular sign, symp-
tom, and test configurations in the 
various diagnostic cluster groups. 
Let us suppose we wish to compare 
two competing diagnoses. Let us form 
the ratio of p(B [ H,) to p(B [ H,). 
When B has been observed, this ratio is 
termed the likelihood ratio (LR). By 
rearranging Bayes' Theorem we have: 
LR = p(B I Hi) /p(B I H,) 
C(H, I B) / C (H,) 
C(H2 [ B) / C(H 2) 
We then see that the likelihood ratio 
amounts to a comparison of the pos-
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terior-to-prior credence ratios for the 
two diagnoses. If this LR is large we 
might wish to favor H , , or if it is small 
we might wish to favor H , . The LR 
is the basis for the discriminant func-
tion techniques mentioned in the last 
section, and is the principal idea under-
lying the procedures adopted in medi-
cal diagnosis by Neyman (1947, 1950) 
and Collen et al. (1964). 
Alternatively, one could employ di-
rectly the posterior credence ratio 
(CR) given by 
CR = C(H, I B )/ C(H2 [ B ) 
That is, if CR is large we would favor 
H , , but if CR is small we would 
favor H2 . In order to compute CR we 
need to specify the prior credences as 
well as the likelihoods. This can be 
done by appeal to any one of the four 
situations enumerated. In particular, 
situation 1 has been considered. In 
the case of situation 2, the LR = CR 
and this has often been used to justify 
the LR method. 
Conclusions 
Armed with an overwhelming ac-
cumulation of data about disease, how 
can we ensure that they will all be 
employed effectively to make a correct 
diagnosis in a particular patient? The 
use of electronic computers can be 
of some help in the collation, correla-
tion, storage, and communication of 
the accumulated information, but we 
must be careful in instructing the ma-
chinery so we will not one day find 
a monster whose behavior is unpre-
dictable. A reasonable procedure 
would be to analyse our own thought 
processes carefully to ascertain how 
the human diagnostician arrives at his 
conclusions. The matter is certainly 
not settled but the concepts of state 
spaces and the theory of credences 
seem to form a plausible "first model" 
of the human inference maker at work 
making medical diagnoses. It is hoped 
that a wider appreciation of these 
ideas will lead to the construction of 
better models that could enable the 
great potential of the "computer age" 
to have its full impact upon medical 
care. 
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I 
" ... What then is a good experi-
ment? It is that which informs us 
of something besides an isolated 
fact; it is that which enables us to 
foresee , that is, that which enables 
us to generalize. 
"For without generalization fore-
knowledge is impossible. The cir-
cumstances under which one has 
worked will never reproduce them-
selves all at once. The observed 
action then will never recur; the 
only thing that can be affirmed is 
that under analogous circumstances 
an analogous action will be pro-
duced. In order to foresee, then, it 
is necessary to invoke at least 
analogy, that is to say, already 
then to generalize .... 
" ... Thus, thanks to generaliza-
tion, each fact observed enables us 
to foresee a great many others; 
only we must not forget that the 
first alone is certain, that all others 
are merely probable. No matter 
how solidly founded a prediction 
may appear to us, we are never 
absolutely sure that experiment will 
not contradict it, if we undertake 
to verify it. The probability, how-
ever, is often so great that prac-
tically we may be content with it. 
It is far better to foresee even with-
out certainty than not to foresee 
at all." 
Henri Poincare, transl. by 
G. B. Halsted. The Founda-
tions of Science Lancaster, 
Pennsylvania: The Science 
Press, 1946, pp. 128-129. 
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